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Who's Afraid of the Big Bad Wolf: Why
the Fear of Carnivore Is an Irrational
Product of the Digital Age
M. Todd Heflin*
"The only thing right about Carnivore is its name: This digital
beast devours both personal privacy and constitutional limits on state
policepower. "
1
Bart Kosko, Who Needs Big Brother When There's 'Carnivore
I.

Introduction

From the perspective of the average citizen, Bart Kosko's opinion
piece in the Los Angeles Times might sum up the fears of computer
surveillance in the digital age. "Carnivore" is the name of a software
program developed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation at its
computer facilities in Quantico, Virginia.2 The program was revealed to
the general public through a demonstration given to industry experts in
3
July 2000.
This article will examine what is known about how Carnivore
operates and why those opposed to it are not thinking about the limits
placed on its use by existing Fourth Amendment doctrine. Bart Kosko's
quote illuminates the idea held by many in our society that the right of
privacy is separate and distinct from protections provided by the
Constitution. If there is such a right to privacy, does Carnivore's mere
existence somehow invade that right, and, if so, how? In reality, the
same checks the government has placed on itself to prevent unauthorized
intrusion into people's personal lives will probably be enough to extend
* J.D., George Mason University School of Law; Honor's Attorney, Department of
the Interior.
1. Bart Kosko, Who Needs Big Brother When There's 'Carnivore'?,L.A. TIMES,

July 27, 2000, at A15.

2. See id.
3. Neil King, Jr., & Ted Bridis, FBI's Wiretaps To Scan E-mail Spark Concern,
WALL ST. J., July 11, 2000, at A3.
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into cyberspace. In the end, the law will have to catch up to technology,
but the development of Carnivore
does not spell the beginning of an
4
Orwellian existence for us.

II.

Government Electronic Searches in the Pre-Digital Age

The scene is becoming ever more common. An FBI agent, armed
with the tools of a telephone repairman, opens a telephone company box
on the comer of a street in AnyCity, USA. He searches through a huge
number of various colored fiber-optic cable until he locates a specific
batch. After narrowing the wiring down further, he finally settles on a
particular wire. He then plugs a small electronic sensor into the junction
for that wire and leaves behind only a transmitter hooked to the inside of
the box. Then he closes up the telephone box and walks back to a van,
with the markings of the local telephone company, and drives away with
hardly a glance from the pedestrians that crowd the street. When the
agent arrives back at the small apartment from which he is conducting
surveillance, he turns on a powerful receiver the size of a briefcase and
begins to pick up and record the telephone calls coming from the
apartment across the street. The drug dealer being observed has no idea
that the FBI is recording his every word spoken into the handset.
Let's add one more element to this scenario, one that gives it a
twist. While setting the wiretap for the suspected drug dealer, the FBI
agent also sets a tap for the apartment next door, one for which he does
not have a court order, as he does for the drug dealer's apartment. This
apartment is one with which he is not familiar-he does not even know
who lives there. While monitoring this second wire, he picks up
conversations indicating the resident is trafficking in child pornography.
Using this information, the FBI agent obtains an arrest warrant for the
person in the second apartment and a search warrant for the residence.
Without going through the specific Fourth Amendment analysis that
will be examined later,5 most Americans would make the assumption that
the second search, the one conducted at random, was illegal. They
would be correct, and the evidence of that search would most likely be
suppressed under the exclusionary rule adopted as a remedy for Fourth
Amendment violations by government agents. 6 Although e-mail search
technology now operates identically to a wiretap, many privacy
proponents make the assumption that, when similar technology for
searching e-mails falls into the hands of the government, our privacy

4.

GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (Plaume/Harcourt Brace 1983) (1949).

5. See supra notes 57-95 and accompanying text.
6. See supra notes 57-95 and accompanying text.
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rights somehow will be eroded. It is as if the courts will not respond to
unlawful invasions of cyberspace the way they have with other such
invasions.
III. Carnivore: What We Know and What We Do Not
The government has made clear that its ability to obtain evidence
with a valid court order must be preserved in the digital era. In 1994,
Congress enacted the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement
Act ("Digital Telephony Act"). 8 "This Act require[d] telecommunication
carriers, by 1998, to design systems" that would allow the government
"to isolate and intercept communications requested by the government
under court order." 9 With this Act, the government has made
telecommunication companies parties to the surveillance of private
citizens. This is critical when it comes to the FBI's use of Carnivore.
Exactly what Carnivore is and how it works seems to be up for
debate. When the FBI demonstrated the software to a group of industry
specialists in July 2000, the private sector observers were "astonished" at
what Carnivore was capable of doing.' ° The Wall Street Journal
reported that a government computer containing Carnivore would be
taken to an Internet service provider ("ISP"), along with a court order, to
capture certain specific information involving a criminal suspect's e-mail
transmissions.11 The software could supposedly "monitor the routing
information for billions of distinct internet communications such as emails and.., make copies of full messages sent by or received from the
suspect of an FBI criminal investigation."0 2 It was later learned that
Carnivore, along with other software used by the FBI, can "reconstruct
exactly as a surveillance target saw them while surfing the
web pages
13
web."
It appears that Carnivore grew from at least two prior programs that
the FBI attempted to use but that proved deficient.' 4 The closest
predecessor to Carnivore was a program called "Omnivore," which

7. See Kosko, supra note 1.
8. Michelle Skatoff-Gee, Comment, Changing Technologies and the Expectation of
Privacy:A Modern Dilemma, 28 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 189, 204 (1996).
9. Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. §§ 1002(a), 1003(b) (1994)).
10. See King & Bridis, supra note 3.
11. Ted Bridis, CongressionalPanel Debates Carnivore as FBI Moves To Mollify
Privacy Worries, WALL ST. J., July 25, 2000, at A24.
12. Id.
13. Kevin Poulsen, A Web Spying Capability,Multi-Million Dollar Price Tag, and a
Secret CarnivoreAncestor Are Some of the Details To Poke Through Heavy FBI Editing,
SECURITY Focus ONLINE, Oct. 4, 2000, at http://online.securityfocus.com/news/97.

14.

See id.
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began development in February 1997.' 5 Much of the information on
both Omnivore and its current incarnation, Carnivore, has been kept
confidential. 16 The time-line for the projects was released in response to
a Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") request sent to the FBI.17 It
appears that a version of Carnivore was released in September 1999, with
a later version in use as of May 2000.18 As of July 2000, the program
was used at least sixteen times: ten for national security investigations
and six for criminal investigations. 19
Exactly how Carnivore works remains somewhat a secret,
something that the FBI claims is necessary to maintain the integrity of
the software. 2 ° In his testimony before the House of Representatives
Committee on the Judiciary, FBI Assistant Director Donald M. Kerr
called Carnivore a "very specialized network analyzer or 'sniffer' which
runs as an application program on a normal personal computer under the
Microsoft Windows operating system.",2 1 Assistant Director Kerr
indicated that the program worked by "sniffing" the proper portions of
network packets and copying and storing only those packets that matched
a pre-set filter that was programmed in accordance with the particular
court order.2 According to Assistant Director Kerr, the filter can be set
to catch a wide range
of information, but only in conjunction with a
23
order.
court
specific
In order to capture all this information, the Carnivore system is
installed on a laptop that is taken to an ISP and connected to its
network.24 Assistant Director Kerr indicated that the software was safe
to operate over any such network.2 5 The software does not have the
ability to transmit data; the data it collects is stored on a removable hard
disk that is swapped out every few days by an agent. This passive
feature prevents Carnivore from contaminating any networks to which it
is attached.26
15. See id.
16. See id
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See Bridis, supra note 11.
20. Carnivore and the Fourth Amendment: Oversight Hearing on Fourth
Amendment Issues Raised by the FBI's 'Carnivore'Program
Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000) [hereinafter
Hearing] (statement of Dr. Donald M. Kerr, Assistant Director, FBI), available at
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/kerr0724.htm.
•21. See id.
22. See id.
23. Id.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id.
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Assistant Director Kerr made a major point in his testimony that the
software would be used only in conjunction with a court order; however,
that has little to do with what the software is capable of and how it
operates.2 7 The FBI has closely guarded the "code," the programming
details, of Carnivore. The program appears to be capable of more
powerful applications than just collecting and logging specific e-mails
pursuant to a court order. In documents released under an FOIA lawsuit
filed by the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), an FBI lab
report indicated that Carnivore "could 'reliably capture and archive all
unfiltered traffic to the internal hard drive' and could save the
information on removable high-capacity disks as well. 28 The Carnivore
program is actually just one piece of a software package known to the
FBI as "DragonWare" suite.29 The three programs that make up this
suite of software allow for the capturing of e-mails as well as the
reconstruction of web pages that a target has viewed.3 °
The FBI has released very little information on how Carnivore
garners all of this information. What has been released to the public in
response to the FOIA requests has been heavily redacted. 31 The FBI has
said that, unless ordered to do so, it will not give up the code for
Carnivore.32 One reason for the FBI's hesitancy in releasing the code is
the fear that the very persons on whom Carnivore is designed to spy will
come up with software that defeats the program.3 3 Another reason is the
fear that hackers will reproduce the software and be able to monitor email traffic in the same manner as the FBI, but for illegal purposes.34
The FBI has received at least one very important endorsement for
maintaining the details of Carnivore's operation as a secret. Vinton Cerf,
widely regarded by many as the "father of the Internet" because he coinvented parts for the underlying technology in 1973, 35 argued against
turning over the code for Carnivore to ISP's, as many privacy proponents
have suggested.3 6 Cerf indicated that "putting Carnivore software in the
hands of ISP's strikes me as alarming, frankly. 37 Although the FBI
27. See id.
28. FBI E-Mail Trap Far More Powerful Than Advertised Surveillance: The Tool,
Known as Carnivore, Can Capture All Transmissions Through an Internet Service, an
Agency Test Found,L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2000, at A12.
29. See Poulsen, supra note 13.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See Bridis, supra note 11.
34. See id.
35. Ted Bridis, FBI Gets Web Guru Cerf's Support for Carnivore, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 7, 2000, at B8.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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allowed an independent review of the program, all those who took part in
the review had to sign agreements to keep secret all of their observations
about the workings of the software.3 8 Regardless of exactly how
Carnivore works, what may be more important to its longevity and
effectiveness is how it is perceived by the general public.
IV. Public Reaction to a Perceived Privacy Invasion
Although the introduction of personal computers, followed by the
network to connect them, has no doubt made for a more productive
society, it has also changed the way that society views privacy. In a
1992 opinion poll, sixty-eight percent of those interviewed believed that
"the present use of computers represents an actual threat to personal
privacy. '39 This number was up from 1974 and 1978 surveys where the
percentages were thirty-eight and thirty-seven respectively. 40 Another
poll found that the number of people who were "very concerned" about
privacy was up almost fifty percent between 1978 and 1995.41 With this
increase in attention to privacy concerns, it is not surprising that, when
the FBI announced the Carnivore program, the public noticed.
When the FBI announced the existence of Carnivore, there was a
general outcry from privacy groups alleging that the program was a
threat to the free use of the Internet and a grave threat to privacy in
general.42 The hysteria over the program grew so quickly that Congress
held hearings on the topic within a month of the FBI's demonstration to
the private sector.43 Very little was known about the workings of the
program before these hearings created a media storm surrounding the
software.
Representative Melvin Watt, a Democrat, likened the program to
"big brotherism," 44 and staunch law-and-order supporter Bob Barr, a
Republican, called the program "frightening.''45 The fear spread so
quickly that at least one think-tank, the EPIC, dedicated to electronic
privacy filed a FOIA lawsuit seeking the source code for Carnivore one
day after the FBI revealed the program.46 The EPIC filed suit against the
Department of Justice when its FOIA request was not met quickly
38. See id.
39. Seth Safier, Between Big Brotherand the Bottom Line: Privacy in Cyberspace, 5
VA. J.L. & TECH. 6,
7 (2000), at http://www.vjolt.net/vol5/issue2/v5i2a6Safier.html#ffl 1.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See Kosko, supra note 1.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See King & Bridis, supra note 3.
46. See id.

2002]

WHO'S AFRAID OF THE BIG BAD WOLF

enough.4 7 An United States district court ordered the FBI to indicate
how much material was at issue.48
The EPIC was not the only organization to become involved. The
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed an FOIA request three
days after Carnivore was reported in the Wall Street Journal.49 The
FOIA request asked for all FBI records related to any "snooping"
software including all paperwork on the development and the computer
source code and technical specifications.5 0 This was exactly the
information that the FBI did not want to provide. Barry Steinhardt,
Associate Director of the ACLU, stated in a letter to the FBI: "[R]ight
now, the FBI is running this software out of a black box. The FBI is
saying, 'trust us, we're not violating anybody's privacy.' With all due
respect, we'd like to determine that for ourselves." 5' In a letter to
Congress, the ACLU said that the unbridled use of these technologies
"cr[ied] out for Congressional attention if we are to preserve Fourth
52
Amendment rights in the digital age."
In his opinion piece for the Los Angeles Times, Bart Kosko
indicated that the way Carnivore searched through e-mails was the
equivalent of "the police hav[ing] a search warrant to search someone's
bedroom closet and then search[ing] all houses in a city until they find it.
The search itself invades privacy. 53 He added further that "[t]he only
people Carnivore can confidently watch are the innocent citizens whom
it has no right to watch. 54
The public outcry was not limited to the traditional circles from
those who had an infrastructure dedicated to protecting privacy rights. In
this
age
of the
instant
communications,
the
website,
www.stopcarnivore.org, was soon registered. This website has no fewer
than fourteen separate pages that can be reached from the homepage
address. The pages range from Carnivore bulletin boards to a page
dedicated to helping visitors contact their local congressional
representative or senator to protest the use of the software. 55 People from
over half of the world's countries had visited the site by November 21,
47. See id.
48. Elec.
Privacy
Info. Ctr.,
The Carnivore FOIA Litigation, at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/carnivore (last updated May 28, 2002).
49. Press Release, ACLU, In Unique Tactic, ACLU Seeks FBI Computer Code on
"Carnivore" and Other Cybersnoop Programs (July 14, 2002), available at
http://www.aclu.org/Privacy/Privacy.cfm?ID=8035&c= 130&Type=s.
50. See id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See Kosko, supra note 1.
54. Id.
55. Lance Brown, Stop Carnivore.org--Stop the FBI Spy Tool Carnivore Now, at
http://www.stopcarnivore.org/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2002).
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2000, according to a banner on the website.56
It is evident that the rise in personal computer use, and the criminal
use that naturally goes along with any new technology, has led to a new
battleground for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The reaction to the
revelations about Carnivore all came before any criminal prosecution
related to the software's use. Privacy advocates have appealed to
Congress to stop the perceived threat to citizens' constitutionally
protected rights relating to search and seizure even before a single court
has weighed in on the issue. The next section will look at how the courts
have dealt with emerging technologies in the Fourth Amendment context
and whether Carnivore will swallow up the current line of jurisprudence.
V.

Fourth Amendment Analysis in the Twentieth Century

The twentieth century presented new technologies that were
probably never imagined by the Framers of our Constitution. When they
penned the Fourth Amendment, the Framers indicated that a person
should be secure in their person, papers and effects.57 These objects
were much more concrete in their era, but it did not take long for the
landscape to change, requiring the Court to interpret the Constitution in
light of these new technologies.
In 1928, federal prohibition officers wiretapped telephone lines
while investigating an illegal liquor-importation scheme. These wiretaps
were conducted from a nearby building without the agents ever actually
setting foot on the defendant's property. 58 In Olmstead v. United
States,59 the Supreme Court found that, because there was never a
physical trespass on the defendant's property, no search had occurred
and that, because only aural communications were used, there was no
seizure. 60 From Olmstead, the future could be glimpsed by Justice
Brandeis's dissent, in which he argued that "the underlying principles of
the Fourth Amendment must be realized, or '[r]ights declared in words
might be lost in reality."' 6'
56.
57.
58.

See id
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457 (1928).

59. Id.
60. Id.at 459. The Supreme Court stated:
Neither the cases we have cited nor any of the many federal decisions brought
to our attention hold the Fourth Amendment to have been violated as against a
defendant unless there has been an official search and seizure of his person, or
such a seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects, or an actual
physical invasion of his house or 'curtilage' for the purpose of making a

seizure.
Id.
61. See Skatoff-Gee, supra note 8, at 193 (citing Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474
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The courts were slow to catch up with Justice Brandeis's view of
the expansive nature of the Fourth Amendment. It was not until United
States v. Katz62 in 1967 that the Supreme Court took a different view
than the idea that a physical trespass was necessary for a Fourth
Amendment violation to occur. Charles Katz was under surveillance for
running an illegal gambling operation when the FBI placed a remote
listening device in a phone booth used by Katz to make illegal bets.6 3 In
its analysis of his Fourth Amendment challenge to the use of the
recorded conversations, the Court changed course from its earlier holding
in Olmstead, focusing on the fact that the constitutional protections
against unlawful searches and seizures are intended to shield persons and
not places. 64
The Court found that Katz had an expectation of privacy in his
conversations, one that he demonstrated by entering a closed telephone
booth, attempting to shut out the outside world from his conversations.65
Unlike traditional Supreme Court opinions, the test laid out by the Court
in assessing whether a person's actions deserved Fourth Amendment
protections was spelled out in Justice Harlan's concurring opinion, not
that of the majority. 66 The Katz test, as it has become known, is twopronged in nature. 67 The first prong is whether the person in question
demonstrated a subjective expectation of privacy. 68 The second prong is
whether society finds that expectation objectively reasonable.69
Under this test, once the court determines that both an objective and
subjective expectation of privacy exist, Fourth Amendment protections
are triggered, and law enforcement either needs a warrant based on
probable cause or circumstances that justify a warrantless search as
defined by caselaw. In non-technological examples, the Court has found
that a person carrying on a conversation in a public place or growing
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)). Skatoff-Gee quotes a famous Brandeis passage regarded by
some as a hauntingly correct premonition:
The progress of science in furnishing the Government with means of espionage
is not likely to stop with wire-tapping. Ways may some day be developed by
which the Government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can
reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enable to expose to a jury the
most intimate occurrences of the home.... Can it be that the Constitution
affords no protection against such invasions of individual security?
Id. at 193 n.38 (citing Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
62. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
63. Id. at 348.
64. Id. at 351.
65. Id. at 352.
66. Id. at 361.
67. Id.
68.

Id.

69. See Allegra Knopf, Privacy and the Internet: Welcome to the Orwellian World,
11 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 79, 82 (1999) (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 361).
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drugs in an open field is not entitled to the objective expectation of
privacy requirement.7 °
Partially in response to the Court's decision in Katz, Congress
codified Fourth Amendment principles, as applied to oral and written
communications, in Title III of the Omnibus Crime and Safe Streets Act
of 1968 ("Title 111").7' Title III makes it generally impermissible to
intercept aural communications through wire-taps but includes an
exception for law enforcement conducting criminal investigations with
proper court orders.72
Although the 1968 legislation was designed to protect only spoken
or aural wire taps, it was amended by the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act of 1986 ("ECPA") to include electronic communications.73
Combined, these statutes not only provide for the exclusion of evidence
based on illegal interception, but they also provide for a possible civil
penalty in the case of this interception.7 4 The ECPA goes so far as to
codify the plain-view doctrine, under which otherwise protected
communications
that are revealed to the public lose their protected
75
status.
Although it is unclear exactly where e-mail fits into the ECPA, it
does appear that that the protections provided by the ECPA are broader
than those currently available from Fourth Amendment precedent. 76 As
discussed previously, the ECPA provides for civil remedies and
suppression of evidence obtained illegally through wire or oral
communications, regardless of whether there was a Fourth Amendment
violation proven. 77 As pointed out by Kevin V. Di Gregory, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, during the Carnivore hearings:

70. See Skatoff-Gee, supra note 8, at 196-97 (discussing the various factors that the
Court examined when determining the objective test of a privacy expectation and citing
considerations such as the use ascribed to the area of the search, society's longstanding
beliefs, and legislative enactments).
71. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1975); see Skatoff-Gee, supra note 8, at 197-98.
72. See Skatoff-Gee, supra note 8, at 197-98.
73. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848.
74. See Skatoff-Gee, supra note 8, at 202; see also Francis A. Gilligan & Edward J.
Imwinkelried, Cyberspace: The Newest Challengefor TraditionalLegal Doctrine, 24
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 305, 308 (1998).
75. See Skatoff-Gee, supra note 8, at 202. Skatoff-Gee gives the example of a
university e-mail system in which those who send e-mails to individuals maintain an
expectation of privacy with those communications but when the university sends out a
list serve e-mail, that expectation of privacy ceases to exist. The author makes the
assumption that the private e-mails maintain an expectation of legal privacy, but she does
not cite to specific case law for support. Id.
76. See Gilligan & Imwinkelried, supranote 74, at 308.
77. Id. at 308.
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[B]ecause of the privacy values it protects, the wiretap statute, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510-22... places a higher burden on the real-time
interception of oral, wire, and electronic communications than the
Fourth Amendment requires. In the absence of a statutory exception,
the government needs a court order to wiretap communications. To
obtain such an order, the government must show that normal
investigative techniques for obtaining such information have or are
likely to fail or are too dangerous ....
Deputy Assistant Di Gregory assured Congress that the Department of
Justice has installed its own protocols for using such programs as
Carnivore that require the agent conducting an investigation to submit a
Title III application to the Department of Justice Office of Enforcement
Operations for approval prior to using the technology.79
Many commentators liken the use of Carnivore for the purposes of
sifting through email to the Smith v. Maryland0° pen register case. In
Smith v. Maryland, the Supreme Court found that obtaining the records
from a telephone company of all the numbers dialed from a suspect's
phone did not constitute a search. 8' The Court distinguished Smith from
Katz by reasoning that a phone user knows, or should reasonably know,
that a third party, the phone company, has access to this information for
various non-investigatory reasons.82 The pen register, as it is known,
simply allowed the government access to information in which the
suspect did not maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy.
However, there is already precedent to indicate that the courts will
not employ such an interpretation to electronic media. In one of the early
appellate cases to address the searching of e-mail messages, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces found a higher expectation
of privacy in e-mail transmissions.8 3
In December 1991, an America Online ("AOL") subscriber reported
that other subscribers to the service were possibly trafficking in child
pornography.84 The subscriber provided AOL with the screen names of
individuals involved, which AOL then passed on to the FBI. From this
information the FBI obtained a search warrant for information related to
the subscribers using the screen names provided by AOL.8 5 Pursuant to
the warrant, AOL turned over 12,000 to 14,000 pages of e-mail messages
78. See Hearing,supra note 20 (statement of Kevin Di Gregory, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General), available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/digr0724.htm.
79. See id.
80. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
81. See id at 741-42.
82. Id.
83. See United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
84.

Id. at412.

85.

Id.
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86
along with numerous high-capacity disks containing visual materials.
The FBI subsequently determined that an Air Force colonel with twentyfive years of service was one of
the AOL subscribers involved in the
87
trafficking of child pornography.
The indictment was the result of at least two search warrants, as
well as AOL turning over information that was not even requested by the
FBI.88 The defense filed a motion to suppress both the e-mails that were
part of the specified search warrant
and those that the ISP provided in
89
warrant.
search
the
to
addition
In granting the defendant's motion to suppress the e-mails, the court
analogized these electronic communications to two other protected forms
of communications.9"
The court found that viewing e-mails was
analogous to monitoring phone calls. 91 The court observed that "the
maker of a telephone call has a reasonable expectation that police
officials will not intercept and listen to the conversation; however, the
conversation itself is held with the risk that one of the participants may
reveal what is said to others. 92 The court made a similar analogy to
first-class mail, finding that the sender has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the mail to be free from government snooping while in transit;
however, the expectation of privacy does not protect
the sender from
93
possession.
upon
mail
the
with
does
receiver
what the
Not all analogies to other types of searches are so clear about the
protection afforded e-mail. Very little protection has been given to those
using cordless telephones. 94 Although the Maxwell court did not
analogize e-mail to the cordless phone, there is no reason to believe that
another appellate court in the future could not find such a comparison
helpful. In the area of plain view, the courts have also found that police
agents can trespass on land or view it from the air and still justify a plainview seizure.95 These types of searches also may be useful in future
analysis of governmental collection of e-mail data.

86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.at 414.
89. Id.
90.
91.

1d. at417-18.
See id. at 414 (citing United States v. Sullivan, 42 M.J. 360 (C.A.A.F. 1995)).

92;
93.
94.

Id.
at 418.
See id. at 420.
See Gilligan & Imwinkelried, supra note

74, at 332 n.218 (citing State v. Smith,
438 N.W.2d 571 (Wis. 1989) (finding that that a caller had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in conversations over a cordless telephone)).
95. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v.,U.S., 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986); Oliver v. United.
States, 466 U.S. 170, 180-81 (1984).
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VI. The Law of the Horse: Why Carnivore Will Not Be the End of
Privacy in America
One of the leading legal academics in the field of emerging Internet
technology and the law, Lawrence Lessig, wrote an article for the
December 1999 issue of the HarvardLaw Review titled The Law of the
Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach.96
The strange title, Lessig
explains, comes from a lecture given by Judge Frank Easterbrook at a
"Law of Cyberspace" conference held at the University of Chicago
several years ago where he told a room full of legal academics that there
97
was no more a "law of cyberspace" than there was a "law of the horse."
Judge Easterbrook went on to tell these individuals, who were making
their livings off the discussion of the law of cyberspace, to "stand aside
as judges, lawyers and technologists worked through the quotidian
problems this souped-up telephone would present." 98 As Lessig puts it,
essentially Judge Easterbrook told the legal academics they were serving
only to "muddle rather than clarify" the problem and they should "go
home." 99 Lessig indicates that this lecture served to quiet a crowd of
people and created an "awkward" silence when Judge Easterbrook
finished his welcome speech.100
In his article, Lessig goes on to disagree with Judge Easterbrook's
premise that offering a line of courses addressing the emerging law
dealing with cyberspace issues would not be useful.' 01 Lessig paints a
picture of the world of cyberspace as sufficiently different from the
concrete world so as to need a special language and approach from
02
lawyers and judges when dealing with cases arising within this world.1
Most of Lessig's concerns in both his law review article and his book,
Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, deal with the privacy of the
Internet and how the normal boundaries begin to change. 0 3 One of
Lessig's concerns that he addresses in Code is the "efficient invasion"
that technology allows. 1°4 This is the concept of technology allowing a
search with no physical burdens that are normally present when a search
occurs. Although Lessig had probably not heard of Carnivore when he
96. Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113
HARV. L. REV.501 (1999).
97. See id at 501 n. 1. Apparently the comment was one used several times before;
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wrote Code, he could not have identified the issue better. While the
reaches of Carnivore are not yet known, it is suspected that this program
can search huge amounts of data with very little effort and has the
capabilities to extract information from this data that was impossible
05
without very intensive man-hours being used before its invention.'
This leads to a second problem technology creates involving
privacy-the monitoring issue. An example given by Lessig involves
technology that exists in modern telephone systems.10 6 It is now possible
to constantly monitor telephone calls to find out where the caller lives,
07
how long the call lasted and the line from which the call originated.1
This information that can now be monitored was once only available by
searching for it.
The technology of Carnivore will likely create a system that would
allow the government to monitor every e-mail message for "key" words
such as bomb or kill. If the program is not yet sophisticated enough to
do so, it is only a question of when, not if, it will be.
How would any of this apply in the world of government
surveillance and criminal activity in cyberspace-the new world of
Carnivore? It would not. That seems like a simplistic answer, but the
brief overview of the current state of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
was meant to demonstrate the adaptation of that body of law. Those
privacy "proponents" who ran to the legislative branch to prevent the use
of Carnivore were mistaken in their approach. The idea of preventing
the mere possession of privacy invasive materials by the government for
fear of misuse is not realistic. In the early hypothetical example
involving the government agent randomly tapping a telephone line, there
is little doubt in our legal community that the "fruits of the poisonous
tree" 10 8 would be suppressed. A more non-technological example would
be the fear expressed by the ACLU in the earlier-mentioned letter, that
law enforcement already possesses lock-picking equipment that would
allow them to break into every house in a city looking for the closet they
possessed a warrant to search. 10 9 However, the public outcry would be
too severe to allow that. Some argue that failure to stop the use of
Carnivore somehow will erode our rights. The concept of restricting
government searches that are unreasonable is one in which the party
must show damage. We do not allow third parties to press the claims of
others in criminal cases; we wait for those whose rights have been
105.
106.
107.
108.

See id.
See id. at 157.
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abridged to make their own claims.
This system does not require a "law of the horse" to ensure our
rights are protected. The Katz two-prong test is set up to look at how our
society feels about certain areas and the expectation of privacy we
maintain within those areas. The prominent constitutional scholar
Laurence Tribe said: "[N]ew technologies should lead us to look more
closely at just what values the Constitution seeks to preserve." 110 If
anything, the world of cyberspace and the speed in which information
emerges in this new digital-age will bring the use of Carnivore before the
courts sooner rather than later if the FBI chooses to use it in
prosecutions. Thirty-nine years passed between Olmstead and Katz, and
during that time the government was allowed to tap our telephones
without search warrants. Big Brother never came to take over-we are
not all enslaved to a system that took away our privacy. 11' Instead, the
Court finally recognized that there was an expectation of privacy in our
telephone conversations.
As with everything in this age, time periods are being reduced. It is
safe to say it will not take thirty-nine years for the Court to look at the
use of Carnivore, and if decisions like Maxwell are an indicator, we will
maintain a protected interest in our e-mail. Unlike Lessig, it appears to
this author that the courts are fully capable of protecting our privacy
interests without the legislatures of the country regulating the
architecture of the internet.
VII. Conclusion
Inevitably, when one discusses legal issues surrounding technology
like Carnivore, those advocating its destruction point to the potential for
abuse that is inherent in its use. When arguing that the courts, using
tools like the civil liability of Title III and the exclusionary rule, can
reign in the rogue FBI that begins monitoring every e-mail and uses
illegally obtained evidence for prosecution, the response from privacy
advocates is almost universally the same: The FBI can scan every email, find information that is incriminating and then backtrack until they
find a legitimate way to discover it. They can then lie under oath about
how they obtained the information and the Carnivore use will remain
secret. To this there is only one response-you are right. If we allow
advancing technology to change our faith in the integrity of the law
enforcement community, then all the protections we seek from the courts
110. Laurence H. Tribe, The Constitution in Cyberspace: Law and Liberty Beyond
the Electronic Frontier, Address at the First Conference on Computers, Freedom, and
Privacy (Mar. 26, 1991), in HUMANIST, Sept.-Oct. 1991, at 16.
111. See ORWELL, supra note 4.
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and the legislatures will be for naught.
The specter of a government that is willing to falsify information in
order to obtain criminal convictions has little to do with technology.
Again, this is not an issue that arises solely in a digital world. We rely
on the rule of law to protect us from tyrants; neither Lenin nor Mao
possessed the Internet or Carnivore when they began their reigns. As a
society, we rely on the courts to enforce the Fourth Amendment
protections that the founding fathers indicated were inherent in our
system, rights not granted to us, but ones protected from government
abuse. In the end, the courts will prevent Carnivore from devouring
those rights.

